This record has been obtained from the National Archives, reference number ADM 217/591. The material is Crown Copyright.
In transcribing the report below I have corrected errors which I consider are obvious typos in the original text (eg "manoeuvring" for "manoevring" - in all cases where I have made a conscious change, the text will be highlighted in red - this also applies where the original text is difficult to read). I have been unable in all cases to replicate the setting out of the original documents.
If you are interested in viewing copies of the original I am sure if you contact the National Archives they will sell you an electronic copy.
The report comprises Colin Warwick's Reports of Proceedings (11 pages) to which is attached a completed form S.1203, “Report of Attack on U-Boat”, which I have transcribed as accurately as possible (to give you an idea of the appearance of the original document) and added as an attachment hereto. With regard to the remaining Staff Minute Sheets/Memoranda which comment upon the Report, I have included some extracts from these towards the end. I noted that Section 5 of the Reports of Proceedings which usually covers “Oiling at Sea” is missing from the record.
The record came with a number of other documents I have not transcribed outlining the involvement of HMS Hoste and HMS Balfour, including two forms S.1203, “Report of Attack on U-Boat”, completed on behalf of Balfour in respect of two separate attacks, the first on 13 December 1944 and the second on the following day.
Both Hoste and Balfour reported misfires when making the attacks referred to in the Reports of Proceedings, one as a result of a snarled lanyard, and the other due to an excess of grease in a firing pin mechanism. The Commanding Officer of HMS Hoste wrote with reference to the snarled lanyard incident, “Unfortunately the ship has been in action only on rare occasions so that there is still a marked tenseness amongst everyone, in spite of frequent harbour drills and exercising at sea, when at action stations for the ‘real thing’.”
It is interesting to contrast the assessments in the forms S.1203 of the Commanding Officers of Balfour and
These have to rate as the most exciting (and lengthy) Reports of Proceedings I have transcribed to date – whilst, mercifully, no ships were lost, it seems likely U-boats in the vicinity regarded this convoy as a "prospect" – reading, as a layman, the Narrative of Events, one has the impression it may have been a combination of the escort’s sophisticated defensive tactics and aggressive attitude (even edginess), which ultimately deterred the enemy from attacking.
If you would like further information about this convoy, particularly details of the merchant ships which sailed with the convoy, I recommend you take a look at Convoy Web.
REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS
(ACI Articles 520/1.)
CONVOY No. SL.178/MKS.69
Escorted by
B.21 ESCORT GROUP
HMS
(SO Escort)
HMS “BALFOUR”
HMS “HOSTE”
(R.C. Warwick)
Lieutenant Commander RNR
Senior Officer B.21
Escort Group
Distribution:-
FOGMA 3 Copies
CinC Med 1 Copy
Captain (D),
Captain (D),
Captain (D),
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *
REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS (ACI Article 520/1.)
CONVOY No. SL.178/MKS.69 B.21 ESCORT GROUP
Section 1. Narrative of Events
a. Rendezvous. All R/Vs were made on time and without difficulty.
MKS.69 (20 ships including one ship joining from
The MKS.69 section with Commodore Baxter RNR in SS GLAUCUS as Commodore, and Commodore Ratsey RNR in SS MAIHAR as Vice-Commodore formed up off Carnero Point at 1500A December 5th.
The speed of advance for the Convoy was advertised as 7½ knots but there being several 7½ knot ships in the Convoy it was apparent that the Convoy would be fortunate to make good 7 knots, and a few hours after leaving Gibraltar, SS MIGUEL DE LARRINAGA signalled that she had leaky boiler tubes and would only be able to make good 7 knots for the time being.
SL.178 (19 ships including four ships joining from
At 1400A on the 6th December SL.178 was sighted. SO Escort was HMS NESS assisted by HMS CYCLAMEN. Commodore Baxter joined the two sections with great finesse, and the Master of SS FREDERICK BANTING, Commodore of SL.178 became Rear-Commodore of the combined convoys.
SS DRAKEPOOL
At 1300A on the 7th December SS DRAKEPOOL escorted by HMS ANCHUSA joined the convoy. ANCHUSA returned to
b. Escorts.
HMS RUSHEN CASTLE was the sole escort sailed with the Convoy, HMS PIMPERNEL the remaining ship of the B.21 Group being required to act as “Sheep Dog” to the next MKS sailing on the 11th.
Stationing of Escorts. Close Escort.
Station Convoy
PERIOD No NAMES Day Night Formation
1450A 5th ) 1. Rushen Castle “A” “A” 9 Columns SL & MKS
2000A 10th) 6 Columns MKS only
2000A 10th) 3.
1700A 12th) Balfour “D” “G” ? Columns 9
Hoste “N” “Q”
1700A 12th) 3.
0400A 15th) Balfour “EFG” “EFG” 1600A 12th Dec
Hoste “OPQ” “OPQ” 3 Columns after
1600A 13th Dec
Remarks:- When the Convoy formed a narrow front, Escorts patrolled through the stations “M.A.C”, “E.F.G”, and “O.P.Q”, weaving at a speed of 12/13 knots. Escorts on the beam and flanks working their way up and down the convoy so that on either side at any one time there was one of them on the Convoy beam and one on the flank.
Thus in addition to screening, escorts could keep the “tail” closed up, and clear of navigational danger, and direct other shipping clear at night.
HMS
December 15th 1944
REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS (ACI Article 520/1.)
CONVOY No. SL.178/MKS.69 B.21 ESCORT GROUP
Section 1. Narrative of Events (contd)
Stationing of Escorts. Support Group.
At 1040A, 13th December HMS BYRON and HMS DEANE joined in position 50 deg: 01’N. 06 deg: 38’W (Round Island) to support the Irish Sea Section to Trevose Head. The support group swept 6 miles ahead of the Convoy on the MLA until 1720A 13th Dec: when off Trevose Head, then sweeping astern before resuming patrol.
CinC,
HMS BALFOUR and HMS HOSTE joined to reinforce the close escort at 2000A 10th December, in position 44 deg: 23’N. 10 deg: 02’W, remaining with the Convoy throughout, and escorting the Clyde Section to the Clyde Light Vessel.
B.21’s 091400A. 102700A. Refer to joining of the latter.
HMS BALFOUR delegated authority to B.21. ACI Article 2, paragraph 4d, and B.21’s 111730A Section 5, refer.
a. H/F D/F Bearings from U Boats.
For the last four months very few H/F D/F bearings have been obtained whilst escorting these convoys, but from 2100A 11th there was considerable activity during the dark hours throughout the remainder of the voyage. All bearings were Sky Wave.
d. Foxers.
As H/F D/F bearings indicated that U Boats were apparently discussing prospects once more, P/V Displacers were streamed by RUSHEN CASTLE and BALFOUR in calm weather at noon on the 12th December, and the Group was ready to take quick counter measures on any U Boats encountered in the approaches to the Channel, Bristol Channel and Irish Sea.
“BALFOUR” obtains contact at 1222A.
Shortly after streaming her P/V’s “Balfour” obtained a contact on the starboard beam of the Convoy, streamed her Foxers and went in to attack it, although she stated that it might be a non-sub.
The Convoy made an emergency turn to port, and the Liberator providing air escort commenced “Alligator Starboard”, orders being passed by R/T.
“Balfour” reported that the contact was making over 15 knots and she was unable to overtake, and owing to the absence of HE and A/S information, classified the contact as “fish echo”, and rejoined without attacking.
“
At 0206/13th a suspicious contact was obtained and the OOW streamed foxers using the D/C sentries aft, in order to investigate at speed and if necessary make a counter attack. Contact was classified as “non-sub”, and the foxers tripped.
“BALFOUR” attacked another contact, this time a very promising one at 0737A/13th, making three D/C, and one HH attack.
REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS (ACI Article 520/1.)
CONVOY No. SL.178/MKS.69 B.21 ESCORT GROUP
Section 1. Narrative of Events (contd)
d. Foxers.
“BALFOUR” carried out her attacks with foxers, completing her last attack in position 49 deg: 38’N. 06 deg: 52’W at 0846A.
“
No difficulty was experienced either in holding contact or manoeuvring with Foxers streamed, or in holding contact whilst the attacking ship ran in with foxers “chattering”.
e.
At 1445A/12th HMS MIGNONETTE and HMS PORCHER escort for the English Channel section were sighted ahead, and joined in position 49 deg: 14’N. 07 deg: 40’W at 1530A, PORCHER taking up position “F”, MIGNONETTE closing the Commodore to pass charts, then to position “B”.
At 1700A the
HMS
December 15th 1944
REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS (ACI Article 520/1.)
CONVOY No. SL.178/MKS.69 B.21 ESCORT GROUP
Section 2. DETAILED REPORTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY.
a. Attack on possible U.Boat by HMS BALFOUR.
At 0737A December 13th, HMS BALFOUR obtained a firm contact on the starboard quarter of the Convoy in position 49 deg: 38’N. 06 deg: 52’W and carried out the following attacks:-
At 0737A Depth Charge Attack
At 0748A Hedgehog Attack
At 0828A Depth Charge Attack
At 0846A Depth Charge Attack
Evidence.
“Balfour” reported that small patches of light oil were observed at daylight, but no further evidence of destruction.
Non-Subs in the area.
According to latest information there are no “non-subs” or wrecks in that position or near the area.
Detailed Report.
The following data is being forwarded through the Captain (D) GREENOCK, HMS BALFOUR’S administrative authority:-
(a). Forms S.1203 and S.1179.
(b). Traces from Range, Bearing, Depth and Echo
Sounding Recorders.
(c). Track Chart.
(d). Action diagrams.
b. Attack on possible U.Boat or Wreck of U.Boat.
HMS HOSTE reported that she has “quite a good contact” on her starboard side, on the port beam of the convoy at 1925A December 14th, in position 50 deg: 26’ 45”N. 05 deg: 15’W, and initiated a Hedgehog attack.
At 1934A HOSTE reported that 2 explosions at 19 and 19½ seconds in a depth of 45 fathoms resulted from her first attack, that she had firm contact and was making a second Hedgehog attack.
As there were no known wrecks or non-subs in the position HMS BALFOUR whose Displacer P/V’s were streamed, was instructed to join HOSTE and run her foxers, and in the event of a U.Boat surfacing to take over from HOSTE.
Data of attacks carried out by
HMS
December 15th 1944
REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS (ACI Article 520/1.)
CONVOY No. SL.178/MKS.69 B.21 ESCORT GROUP
Section 3. Remarks on Air Escort.
On the 12th December air escort was provided by one US Liberator. Call sign HMW.1.
Homing Aircraft.
Watch was set at 0740A in accordance with instructions signalled, but nothing was heard from the aircraft until an hour later at 0850A. Homing procedure was carried out satisfactorily, the aircraft being sighted at 0930A.
Communication.
Communication by R/T on 2410 kcs was good throughout.
Patrols carried out by aircraft.
0930 to 1226 COBRA
1226 to 1300 ALLIGATOR Starboard. (HMS Balfour
investigating contact on Starboard side)
1300 RECOIL
1310 to 1430 ADDER
1430 RECOIL
1440 to 1540 CROCODILE 15. (Instructed to report on
sighting Escorts joining from ahead)
At 1540 the aircraft left having stated that he was sorry that he could not stay longer but (quote) “we lost a lot of stuff out there”.
All signals were executed promptly, and patrols well carried out.
HMS
December 15th 1944
REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS (ACI Article 520/1.)
CONVOY No. SL.178/MKS.69 B.21 ESCORT GROUP
Section 4. Remarks on Convoy
With the exception of three fairly fine days the weather was both vile and adverse.
Station-keeping.
As the speed of the Convoy was at times reduced to 3½ to 4 knots, the larger ships in the Convoy found it very difficult to keep station, particularly at night, and station-keeping was rather ragged in consequence.
Stragglers.
At 1000A 9th December after a rough night when the Convoy made good about 3½ knots, and about 4½ in the morning following, two stragglers SS GLENWOOD and SS MIGUEL DE LARRINAGA were out of sight astern, and were reported as stragglers by signal TOO 091400A.
Stragglers rejoin.
At daylight on the morning of the 11th December the two stragglers rejoined and managed to remain with the Convoy thereafter. Signal was made TOO 111730A Section 1, reporting this.
Doctor visits SS FORT ORLEANS.
On the 9th the Master of the
The “
The whaler was dropped ahead of the ORLEANS who stopped engines being instructed to come ahead as soon as the Doctor boarded, in the meantime Rushen Castle had circled and was ready to pick up the whaler as the latter came astern of the ship. The same procedure was carried out to pick up the Doctor about half an hour later.
Times were:- 1345. Slipped whaler ahead of M/V.
1400. Whaler hoisted up and underway.
1435. Slipped whaler ahead of M/V.
1455. Whaler hoisted up. Underway.
Weather, Sea and swell 34. Wind NW force 4.
By this manoeuvre the
SS TOBRUK buries a seaman.
At 1417A 9th SS TOBRUK (PS) hauled out of line to bury a deceased seaman. No request had been made for medical assistance.
HMS
December 15th 1944
REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS (ACI Article 520/1.)
CONVOY No. SL.178/MKS.69 B.21 ESCORT GROUP
Section 4. Remarks on Convoy (contd)
Army Deserter reported by SS EGYPTIAN PRINCE.
A further domestic trouble in the Convoy was provided by SS EGYPTIAN PRINCE on December 8th when the following signal was received from the Commodore.
“Following received from EGYPTIAN PRINCE No: 92. An Army deserter from
This problem not being dealt with by ACI or KR & AI, the following was sent to the Commodore.
“Reference Army deserter.
“1. Master should make a thorough investigation with a view to establishing identity and a note taken in writing of the proceedings. Deserter should be asked formally if he has any statement to make, and such statement if any to be signed and witnessed.
“2. Deserter should be kept under lock and key and under an armed guard, if considered necessary. DEMS* ratings may be used for this purpose.
“3. Military Authorities at port of destination should be informed on arrival. The latter should send escort for deserter. Report of investigation and statement should be handed to NCO in charge of escort, and a receipt obtained for deserter.
“4. Suggest Master takes no action regarding suspected assistance from crew until he has taken advice on the matter from shore authorities.
“KR & AI does not cover this problem. We do not hold copy of Merchant Shipping Act.”
The master of Egyptian Prince did not state the sex of the deserter.
The above problem may arise with other ships from the
HMS
December 15th 1944
REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS (ACI Article 520/1.)
CONVOY No. SL.178/MKS.69 B.21 ESCORT GROUP
Section 6. Communications
a. Reception of Broadcasts.
Reception of BN Routines was satisfactory throughout.
b. Communication with Commodore.
Communication with the Commodore by R/T, and TBY/TBS was good.
c. Radar.
During thick weather on the 14th whilst rounding the Smalls Light, and coming up the Irish Sea, a Radar Plot was kept by the Navigating Officer S/Lt AF Weeks RNR for five hours the Commodore being passed the following information by TBS, and V/S.
1. Rounding the Smalls. 0930A to 1300A
Commodore being passed his bearing and distance from the Smalls Light every 0 minutes.
Other Convoy Southbound plotted, and the rear ships of own Convoy, and information passed to the Commodore at intervals.
d. D/F Bearings.
After losing Radar contact with the Smalls at about 1430, D/F bearings were obtained until the weather cleared at about 1730A, and the Commodore passed his position every 30 minutes.
It was very satisfying to be able to pass accurate positions to the Escort of the Southbound Convoy of their exact position within a minute of receiving a request for a check.
HMS
December 15th 1944
REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS (ACI Article 520/1.)
CONVOY No. SL.178/MKS.69 B.21 ESCORT GROUP
Section 7. Material
RADAR DEFECTS. The Radar was out of action for the following periods.
1800A to 2025A 10th Dec. 0445A to 1830A 12th Dec.
0155A 13th to 0835 13th Dec.
It is believed that tests were carried out with “
It is considered that the continual faults occurring in the Radar are due to excessive vibration, as the faults are caused by parts breaking by continuous movement. It is much to the credit of the manufacture of the gear, that it lasts for any time at all.
The main defects are in the lantern itself, an analysis of defects since the gear was fitted is attached, and I feel proves the point regarding vibration.
PEDESTAL UNIT 19 P. Patt. W 3308 Analysis of defects
Date fitted: 15.2.44.
Repaired
Defect Date Ship or Shore Date Remarks
Aerials not turning Locking rings loose
with drive. 17.5.44 Ship 17.5.44 causing shaft to fall
and gears disengage.
Aerials slipping 1.10.44 Ship 1.10.44 Planet gear wheels
loose and teeth
damaged. Stationary
rack ring loose.
Aerials jammed.
by shore staff.
Aerials not turning
with drive. 9.11.44 Ship 9.11.44 Locking rings loose
causing shaft to fall
and gears disengage.
Aerials jammed. 10.12.44 Ship 10.12.44 Stationary rack ring
loose.
Aerials only train
through 30
degrees 11.12.44 Ship 12.12.44 Planet gear wheel
loose.
------------------------------
TRAINING GEAR. Date fitted 15.2.44
Bowden Cable 28.9.44 Ship 28.9.44 Cable repaired after
broken. replaced by new cable
obt. Shore 6.10.44.
Coupling to 10.12.44 Ship 10.12.44 Connections to Bowden
pedestal not turning cable re-assembled
with Bowden cable. and tightened.
HMS
December 15th 1944
REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS (ACI Article 520/1.)
CONVOY No. SL.178/MKS.69 B.21 ESCORT GROUP
Section 7. Material (contd)
Analysis of Radar defects due to vibration.
LEADS. A:- Local Oscillator C:- Pulse cable B:- IF
Category Fitted Defect & Date Replaced Remarks
by Ship
A. 15.2.44 Broken lead 6.5.44 6.5.44) Leads replaced
) from office
B. 15.2.44 Broken lead 4.7.44 4.7.44) to mixer box.
at clamp in
lantern.
A. 6.5.44 do. 5.7.44 6.7.44 Broken section
cut sufficient
spare to allow
re-connection.
------------------------------
Note:- Junction Box fitted in lantern 15.8.44.
Strutless lantern fitted 20.10.44.
A. 6.5.44 Faulty lead 20.10.44 20.10.44 Lead replaced
Office to
Junction box.
B. 5.8.44 Broken lead 20.10.44 20.10.44
in clamp in Leads replaced
lantern
junction box
A. 5.8.44 Broken lead 8.11.44 8.11.44
to mixer.
A. 6.11.44 Broken lead 4.12.44 4.12.44
at clamp in
lantern.
C. 5.8.44 Broken lead 10.12.44 10.12.44
B. 22.10.44 Broken lead 10.12.44 10.12.44
------------------------------
Other faults in aerial lantern due to heavy vibration.
TRANSMITTER BOX.
19.4.44 NT98 off tune due to shorting bar shaking loose.
11.10.44 Broken solder tag on magnetron filament transformer
25.11.44 Broken lead from input supply plug to magnetron
filament transformer
------------------------------
REFERENCE, AIG 32. 102M. Reduction of and increases of speed have for material reasons always been carried out by the OOW in 10 or 15 revolution steps with about 1 minute interval between each order.
Engine-room have standing orders to work up and down slowly, unless emergency signalled or manoeuvring alongside, to keep a steady level of water in the boilers, and avoid “blowing off”.
HMS
December 15th 1944
REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS (ACI Article 520/1.)
CONVOY No. SL.178/MKS.69 B.21 ESCORT GROUP
Section 8. Special Exercises Carried Out.
Sending whaler away to board a merchant ship. (See Section 4)
Apart from the usual routine exercises of AA guns crews, and cruising watches ? practice rockets on alternate days, and usual dog watch exercises, the weather was too bad for a practice shoot.
Owing to condenser trouble the usual exercises with a submarine could not be fitted in.
SHARK firing practice.
It was arranged with the Gunnery Officer, Captain (D) Gib., to carry out a practice shoot with shark on a target now being prepared, an old tug filled with oil drums, on next visiting the port.
Practice shark have been demanded.
It is intended to arrange for an aircraft to photograph the fall of shot when the shoot takes place
HMS
December 15th 1944
That concludes the Senior Officer’s Reports. It is well worth looking at the attached “Report of Attack on U-Boat”.
With reference to the attached Staff Minute Sheet there are a number of comments. The Radar Officer has written:
“With reference to Section 7,
“The majority of the faults listed here could sometimes be, and now normally are, prevented by regular inspection and tightening up of components concerned. I have asked Capt. (D)
“The difficulty of broken leads has been overcome by fitting a junction box in the lantern so that only this portion has to be replaced, a job which can be carried out in a quarter of an hour”.
Another Staff Officer commented “SO’s initiative in arranging for a realistic Shark practice for his next visit to
Section 2 of the Reports of Proceedings records that following the first of the two attacks on possible U-boats, “’Balfour’ reported that small patches of light oil were observed at daylight, but no further evidence of destruction.” In fact HMS Balfour took a sample of this oil back with it for analysis – a staff officer records “Captain D Greenock has forwarded oil sample to DAVD for analysis – consider there is no definite evidence of presence of a U boat and I am inclined to think contact was probably non sub.” A quick check of the U-boats listed as missing on uboat.net reveals that U-650 under the command of Oblt. Rudolf Zorn went missing from 9 December 1944, but is believed to have been lost in the North Atlantic or Arctic Ocean - it does seem highly likely this was a non-sub contact.
Finally there is a comment related to the advice Colin Warwick gave to the Master of the SS Egyptian Prince following the discovery of an Army stowaway/deserter – “… should be included in WA Bulletin as being of considerable interest and value to others”.
* Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships.
** Searching the Catalogue on the National Archives site, I have found this, "ADM 1/16501 ARMAMENTS (11): Rocket propelled torpedos (Rocket Sharks): proposed launching against surfaced submarines from small craft: report of trials 1944." - might be worth a look.
Attachments:
